Bar Bulletin

November, 2003

MSBA News


Can A Mandatory Arbitration Clause In A Consumer Contract Prohibit Arbitration On A Class-Wide Basis?
By E. Hutchinson Robbins, Jr.

Mandatory arbitration provisions have become an increasingly common component of many consumer contracts. Some arbitration clauses prohibit the use of the class action procedure in arbitration while others are silent on that issue. Either way, the ability of consumers to bring class action arbitration is at the forefront of the dispute regarding the enforceability of mandatory arbitration provisions in consumer contracts. While no reported Maryland decision appears to address the issue of whether an arbitration provision in a consumer contract may prohibit the use of the class action procedure, there are reasons to believe that the Court of Appeals would, sans other factual circumstances amounting to unconscionability, uphold such a provision.

In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether consumers may bring a class action arbitration proceeding if the underlying arbitration agreement is silent on that issue. In a plurality opinion, the Court held that the arbitrator, applying state law, should make the decision. However, the Court’s several opinions in Bazzle offer a somewhat muddled roadmap for assessing how arbitration clauses that forbid class actions will be treated in the future.

In Bazzle, a commercial lender and its customers entered into a loan agreement that included a clause stating that all “disputes, claims or controversies” relating to the agreement would be resolved by binding arbitration. The customers filed suit in South Carolina state court against the lender, alleging that the lender failed to provide them and other customers with a legally required form. The plaintiffs requested that the court certify their claims as a class, and the lender requested the court to compel arbitration on a non-class basis. In response, the court both compelled arbitration and ordered that the arbitration go forward as a class action. After the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the class status, the lender appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court’s four-justice plurality decision stated that it was up to the arbitrator to decide whether an arbitration agreement allowed for class-wide claims. Although they rejected the argument that class action arbitration is unavailable whenever the agreement is silent on the issue, it appears from the opinion that these justices would agree that an arbitration provision could specifically and expressly forbid class action arbitration and would uphold an arbitrator’s or state court’s holding to that effect. The three dissenting justices stated that the Federal Arbitration Act controlled the interpretation of the arbitration agreement and that the Supreme Court could determine what it meant. Consequently, they opined that the arbitration agreement was not indeed silent on the issue, but in fact precluded the use of the class action mechanism. In light of this precedent regarding arbitration provisions that are silent as to the availability of a class action, how would Maryland’s courts rule on the enforceability of an arbitration provision that forbade class action arbitration?

One of the principal arguments against the prohibition of class actions in the arbitration process is that such provisions deny consumers access to legal remedies afforded them under state law and are thus procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The notion that a consumer contract should not be interpreted to deprive consumers of the right to assert claims as a class that would be too small or expensive to assert on an individual basis, however, has been rejected by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. In Gilman v. Wheat, First Securities, Inc., the Court of Appeals enforced a forum selection clause in a securities brokerage contract that required claims be litigated in a jurisdiction (Virginia) that lacked a class action mechanism. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that because Virginia did not have a class action mechanism he would be denied an adequate remedy. The Court noted that the unavailability of a class action mechanism does not violate the public policy of Maryland and stated that “[w]e are unaware of any case – and none has been cited to us – in which the unavailability of a class action procedure, either generically or in a particular case, has been regarded as sufficient to render an otherwise valid forum-selection clause unenforceable.” The Court’s reasoning in Gilman could readily be transferred from its application to a forum selection clause that effectively deprived the consumer of the procedural mechanism of a class action to an arbitration provision that did the same. Whether an analogy to Gilman would carry the day for a party seeking to enforce arbitration on an individual basis, however, remains to be seen.
 

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