The Commercial Law Article is replete with provisions providing special protections
for consumers who have purchased goods for cash or on credit. From unenforceable
disclaimers of implied warranties to the Consumer Protection Act, Maryland
has a rich history of promoting consumer rights.
Unfortunately for consumers, the General Assembly diminished
this tradition when it adopted revised Article Nine by deleting many of the
consumer protections contained in the proposed uniform draft. Consistent with
other UCC Articles, the proposed draft of revised Article Nine distinguished
consumer debt and business debts by providing broader protection and resulting
remedies for consumers. As a general rule, the proposed provisions relating
to consumer protections and remedies are applicable if the loan was incurred
primarily for personal, family or household purposes or the collateral involves
goods used primarily for that purpose. Proposed Section 9-625, for example,
imposed a $500 penalty upon a secured party who fails to terminate control
of various intangible property rights, improperly files a financing statement,
fails to explain or account for a surplus and/or fails to provide an accounting
to a debtor regarding their payment history.
Maryland chose not to adopt any of these consumer protections
but did adopt proposed 9-625’s penalty provisions regarding a secured
party’s failure to abide by the default provisions of Article Nine. This
disobedience typically occurs when the debtor is not actually in default or
the secured party breaches the peace when repossessing the collateral, fails
to notify the debtor or conducts a commercially unreasonable sale or fails
to tender to a debtor a surplus from a disposition sale.
Proposed revised Section 9-625 also would have allowed Maryland
consumers to continue to benefit from the absolute bar rule by allowing the
courts to determine the effect of a secured party’s failure to comply
with Article Nine’s disposition requirements. In 1980, Maryland joined
several other jurisdictions when the Court of Appeals adopted the absolute
bar rule, which prohibited a secured party form obtaining a deficiency judgment
if the secured party had not properly notified a debtor of an intended sale
of the collateral. However, the General Assembly repudiated the consumer-oriented
absolute bar rule by adopting a version of 9-625 which imposes a rebuttable
presumption that the value of the collateral equals the amount of the debt
upon a secured party who fails to comply with Article Nine.
The General Assembly did not stop there, however. In addition
to repudiating the absolute bar rule for consumer loans governed by Article
Nine and not adopting many of the consumer protections contained in the proposed
draft of Section 9-625, the consumer protections which were contained in the
version of Section 9-625 adopted by the General Assembly frequently cannot
be utilized by consumers.
In a typical scenario, when a consumer debtor defaults the
secured party will resort to its primary weapon in its enforcement arsenal:
the right to repossess. The original draft of Article Nine as well as the revised
version recognized that debtors frequently may have little equity in the collateral
at the time of default. If so, traditional measures of damages for conversion
provide little incentive for attorneys to agree to pursue redress for debtors
who have been the victim of an improper repossession and just as importantly
provide little deterrence to overreaching secured parties. As the drafters
of the revised version expressed in Comment Four to Section 9-625, “[it]
is designed to ensure that every non-compliance with the requirements of the
default provisions in a consumer-goods transaction results in liability.” This
liability is a pure penalty and thus is not dependent upon a debtor proving
they were injured. Rather, in Maryland as in other states, the amount of the
penalty is measured by two separate formulae.
1. If the debtor has borrowed money from a third party who
is not the seller, the debtor is entitled to the amount of the service charge,
plus 10 percent of the principal amount of the debt. The service charge is
the interest which will accrue over the life of the loan and not just the service
charge remaining when the consumer-debtor brings suit. The principal amount
of the debt, of course, means the original amount of the debt without any additions
for interest or deductions for payment made.
2. If the debtor has borrowed money from the seller, the
formula for recovery is the time price differential plus 10 percent of the
cash price. The time price differential is the difference between the time
(or credit) price which a buyer would pay for an item if he borrowed the money
and paid for it over a period of time and the cash price which the same buyer
would pay if he borrowed no money and paid the full price immediately for the
item.
Regrettably, consumers will not be able to utilize 9-625’s
penalty formulae if the secured party has chosen to have the loan governed
by Title 12 of the Commercial Law Article. Thus, the initial assessment of
a consumer debtor’s rights in relation to enforcement of a security interest
must begin with a thorough review of the loan documents to see if the transaction
is governed by Subtitles 1, 6, 9 or 10 of Title 12. If so, the General Assembly,
when it adopted Section 9-201 (c) (3), chose to preclude a debtor from utilizing
9-625’s penalty provisions, even if the creditor has otherwise violated
the default provisions of Article Nine. Furthermore (and perhaps more importantly),
Title 12 does not contain a penalty provision similar to Section 9-625; rather,
Title 12 only precludes a secured party from obtaining a deficiency judgment
if the secured party has violated the enforcement provisions of Subtitles 1,
6, 9 or 10.
While not insignificant, the absolute bar to a deficiency
in a typical run-of-the-mill consumer case does not provide a viable economic
incentive for an attorney to agree to represent a debtor, which along with
deterrence is the primary rationale for the penalty provisions of 9-625. Since
creditors have complete autonomy in determining whether a loan is governed
by Title 12 (although perhaps inadvertently), Maryland consumers suffered a
serious diminishment to the protections they had once enjoyed when the General
Assembly adopted revised Article Nine.
William A. Moore is a solo practioner in Baltimore. He concentrates his practice
on consumer rights, debtor-creditor litigation and criminal defense.