| Bar
Bulletin Focus |
Labor/Employment Law
|
Fourth Circuit Decision Suggests "Flexibility" in Prima
Facie Cases
By Megan Mechak
In November 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued
its decision in Miles v. Dell, Inc, creating a fourth exception to the
requirement that a Title VII plaintiff demonstrate, as part of his or her prima
facie case, that "the position [from which the plaintiff was terminated
or to which the plaintiff was not hired] remained open or was filled by similarly
qualified applicants outside the protected class." Since then, the Fourth Circuit
has applied Miles to allow "flexibility" in proving various prongs of
the plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination. By reiterating the
importance of allowing flexibility when a plaintiff is proving a prima facie case
of discrimination, Miles may have opened the door for future exceptions
to the requirement that a plaintiff meet all four prongs of the prima facie case
to survive a motion for summary judgment where a plaintiff demonstrates that
factual circumstances warrant one.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme
Court established that "[t]he complainant in a Title VII
trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of
establishing a prima facie case of … discrimination." After
the complainant satisfies that initial burden, "[t]he burden
must then shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."
The Fourth Circuit articulated a Title VII complainant's prima
facie case of discrimination, as recounted in Hill
v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt.: "the plaintiff
must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class;
(2) she suffered adverse employment action; (3) she was
performing her job duties at a level that met her employer's
legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse employment
action; and (4) the position remained open or was filled
by similarly qualified applicants outside the protected
class."
The Miles decision reconsidered the fourth prong.
Before Miles, the Court recognized three exceptions
to the fourth prong: (1) in age discrimination cases where
a plaintiff within the protected class is replaced by another
member of the same class who is significantly younger, (2)
where there has been a significant lapse of time between
the plaintiff's application and the employer's eventual decision
to hire another member of the same class, and (3) where the
employer's hiring of another member of the protected class
is calculated to disguise its act of discrimination toward
the plaintiff.
Miles added a fourth exception: "where … firing
and replacement hiring decisions are made by different decision-makers." To
reach that conclusion, the Court noted that the Supreme Court
did not mandate the fourth prong of the prima facie case
and determined that exceptions to that prong could be granted
in "categories of cases that call for an exception."
To determine whether an exception was called for, the Court
considered the rationale for the fourth prong: replacement
of a terminated employee by a member of the same class gives
rise to an inference that the firing was based on a reason
other than the plaintiff's membership in a protected class
and therefore non-discriminatory.
In light of that rationale, the Court concluded that an
exception was appropriate where the hiring and firing decision-makers
were different. If one person rendered the decision to fire
a complainant, a second person's later decision to hire another
member of the protected class has no probative value as to
the motives of the firing.
Miles leaves open not only the possibility of future
exceptions to the fourth prong but additional flexibility
in considering the other elements of the prima facie case
requirement. In Warch v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., the
Fourth Circuit, citing Miles, discussed the "flexibility" inherent
in the prima facie case framework established in McDonnell
Douglas. In Warch, the Court concluded that "[t]he
same [flexibility] requirements apply to the legitimate expectations
and qualifications prongs of the prima facie case."
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Miles reinforces
the purpose of the prima facie case – to weed
clear cases of non-discrimination from a court's docket by
requiring the plaintiff to make basic demonstrations from
which inferences of discrimination may be drawn. Rather than
rigidly impose the prima facie case requirements,
however, the Fourth Circuit has signaled its intention that
the courts remain
"flexible" in their analysis of prima facie cases.
In the Warch decision, the Fourth Circuit has indicated
that the flexibility arising from the Miles exception
is to be employed in reviewing every prong of the prima
facie case.
Megan Mechak is an associate
in the Baltimore office of the law firm of Tydings & Rosenberg
LLP. Her practice includes bankruptcy and creditors' rights
as well as commercial litigation.
|
